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ABSTRACT 
Forest resources and the forest industry have played a key role over the last 90 to 
100 years in providing a livelihood to the people settling in northern British Columbia. 
Pulp mills were attracted to the region because of the availability of residual woodchips 
from area sawmills. The two segments now share the cost of timber harvesting through 
the sale of residual chips from sawmills to pulp mills. In order to be financially 
sustainable the industry must generate returns that compensate the providers of financial 
capital. To test whether this is occurring in the Northern British Columbia forest region 
two firms were selected for study as a proxy for the industry. During the five-year period 
2000- 2004 the lumber assets of one firm earned a return slightly lower than its cost of 
capital while the lumber assets of the second firm generated returns exceeding its cost of 
capital. Panel returns exceeded required returns. Pulp earnings however, were 
significantly below required returns for both firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Northern British Columbia is rich in natural resources and the use of these 
resources has been the basis of development in the region. Forest resources and the forest 
industry have played a key role over the last 90 to 100 years in providing a livelihood to 
the people settling in the north. Over the years the industry has been buffeted by 
economic cycles that at times have encouraged the industry to expand and at other times 
forced it to contract. 
The forest industry, like any other, makes operating and investment decisions 
based on the financial returns generated by their capital investments. During the last 
several decades the primary products manufactured in northern B.C., lumber and wood 
pulp, have been sold globally. The United States has been the primary market for lumber, 
while wood pulp has been shipped to the U.S., Europe and Asia. Over the last 10 years 
the financial return on capital invested in the forest industry in Canada has been 
declining. This is cause for concern because if the industry cannot generate the returns 
required to attract investment to maintain or augment existing capital, the industry will 
become less competitive compared to other regions of the world producing forest 
products where investments have been made. Producers from other countries will meet 
the needs of global consumers. This would have a significant impact on Northern British 
Columbia. 
The prices of commodities on world markets, trade barriers, and new 
manufacturing capacity affect all regions of Canada. Northern British Columbia has a 
unique challenge with the Mountain Pine Beetle, an insect that is killing pine trees in the 
central interior. The large volume and quality of timber available in the next decade and 
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then a reduction in available timber for decades after will have an impact on the northern 
forest industry. 
This paper will look at the question of whether the forest industry in northern 
British Columbia is earning the financial returns required to attract the investment 
necessary to sustain the industry. The two largest firms operating in the Northern Interior 
are used as a proxy for the industry. The two largest product segments are pulp and 
lumber and there is a growing panels component. The weighted average cost of capital 
will be calculated and compared to actual results from the two firms to determine if 
satisfactory returns were achieved. Further, a review of finance literature suggests that the 
firm's cost of capital may not be the appropriate screening rate to evaluate investment 
proposals in multi-division firms where the divisions have substantially different degrees 
of risk. To the extent that divisions in a corporation have degrees of risk and financial 
characteristics that are different from the parent corporation, using the overall hurdle rate 
is certain to lead to incorrect decisions. The cost of capital by market segment for the two 
proxy firms is calculated and compared to actual performance in an effort to understand 
the relative performance of the three market segments. 
The results show that lumber is close to earning the required return, the panels 
segment returns have exceeded its cost of capital, and the pulp segment has not earned 
the required returns for the time period under study. 
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HISTORY OF FORESTRY IN NORTHERN B.C. 
The first harvesting of timber in Northern British Columbia started in 1907 to 
help build the Grand Trunk Pacific Railroad. The rail route was intended to follow the 
Upper Fraser River to Fort George, then cross the river and continue west just south of 
the Nechako River. Wood was needed to supply poles for telegraph lines, ties for the road 
bed and timbers for tunnels. On September 10, 1910 an advertisement for a new town site 
east of Fort George ran in the South Fort Herald newspaper. Among the attractions to the 
new town were "vast timber interests - Saw and Planing Mills and possibly a pulp mill 
being planned". By 1919 there were eighteen sawmills in the 146 miles between Prince 
George and McBride, and further interest in a pulp mill from established companies and 
entrepreneurs. In fact, the first pulp mill did not arrive until the early 1960s. 
The forces for finally establishing a pulp industry in the northern interior started 
from a meeting that Tom Wright, Dean of Forestry at the University of British Columbia, 
had with Ray Williston, Minister of Lands and Forests (Bernsohn 1981). 1 Wright 
discussed his findings from a recently completed study that showed only twenty-five 
percent of the wood on a given acre reached the final product. The remainder was left in 
the forest, broken, ignored or burned as debris - in a word, wasted. Williston later said 
"That meeting made the most powerful impression on me of anything that happened 
while I was Minister" (Bernsohn 1981 ). 
1 No specified date for the meeting was given, but based on Wright' s term as Dean of Forestry we know 
this was circa 1963. 
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Williston captured more of the wasted wood, much of which was to be made 
available to pulpmills, by offering a "carrot' to the industry. Any mill that cut 25,000 
board foot2 measure per shift and 
• installed a barker and a chipper (to make the wood available to pulp mills in a 
form they could use) 
• agreed to cut and process wood down to a four inch top in the interior 
• agreed to use all trees over seven inches wide at breast height or larger in the 
interior 
• cut the stump within a foot of the ground 
was given access to one-third more wood than had been originally bid on. These 
standards were a lot tougher than the earlier ones which allowed stumps to be eighteen 
inches high, permitted tops left behind to be anything under eight inches, and allowed 
trees under eleven inches wide at breast height, to be ignored. Since the smaller logs had 
previously been considered only good for pulp mills, the government charged pulp 
stumpage of $.55 for twelve years. 
Because sawmills could suddenly get more wood without bidding at auctions, and 
could pay very low prices for it, they began to harvest the wood. Lumber companies 
started finding ways to use this "smallwood" economically to produce high-value lumber 
products. With an assured supply of chips, Williston 's job of convincing companies to 
construct pulp mills was made easier. 
In order to give additional fibre supply assurance to companies willing to invest in 
pulp mills the Pulpwood Harvesting Agreement (PHA) was developed in 1961 (Bernsohn 
2 Board foot is a measure equivalent to one square foot of lumber one inch thick. 
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1981). The Agreement guaranteed the right to use wood not normally used by sawmills. 
Because sawmills did not want other firms operating in their timber areas, a rule was 
established prohibiting pulp companies with PHAs from competing with sawmills at 
timber sales, and forcing the pulp firms to purchase chips wherever "economically 
feasible". 
The first pulp mill to be built in northern British Columbia was Prince George 
Pulp, a joint venture between Canadian Forest Products Ltd. and Reed Paper. The firms 
agreed to use as much sawmill waste as was economically possible, and like most other 
interior pulp mills it received an understanding from the government that the mill would 
have the exclusive right to purchase chips from sawmills in the area covered by the 
pulpwood harvesting agreement. This understanding was not in the PHA. Instead, 
agreements covering lumber producers that installed chipping equipment to qualify for 
extra timber often included a clause stipulating who would get the chips produced. 
Construction of the mill started in 1964 and was completed by April 1966. 
Northwood Mills was awarded a PHA in 1964, Intercontinental Pulp and Caribou Pulp 
and Paper were awarded in 1965. 
The arrival of the pulpmills changed the size and shape of the forest industry in 
the north. Chip prices helped keep lumber mills in business when the price of lumber 
dropped. Today a pulp mill in northern B.C. typically uses 65 railcars of chips per day. 
Ray Williston commented, "My goal was the approval of enough pulp capacity to require 
the very poor saw logs to be chipped" (Bernsohn 1981 ). 
In 1973 the lumber industry experienced a recession and lumber prices declined 
forcing shutdowns and layoffs. On October 8, 1973 a group called the Independent Chip 
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Producers was formed, made up of thirty northern sawmills, which claimed they were 
being cheated on the price of chips (Bernsohn 1981). On January 17, 1975 the Timber 
Products Stabilization Act became law, legislating minimum chip prices. Although 
legislated chip prices have long since been abandoned the price paid for chips closely 
links sawmills and pulpmills in the north. 
IMPORTANCE TO NORTHERN ECONOMY 
A study for the B.C. Ministry of Forests based on 2001 information estimated that 
basic forestry employment in the Northern Interior Forest Region accounted for 26% of 
total basic employment with indirect and induced employment ratios ranging from a low 
of 1.13 for logging in the Mackenzie District to a high of 2.14 for pulp and paper in the 
Prince George District (Horne 2004). Direct forestry employment in the Region is second 
only to the Public Sector (36%- comprised primarily of Health and Education). This 
underscores the importance of the forest industry to the economic well being of the 
region. Further, the B.C. Ministry of Forests, Revenue Branch reported that stumpage 
revenue for the Northern Interior Region for calendar years 2004 and 2005 were $462 
million and $483 million, respectively. 
LUMBER PROFITABILITY 
Financial performance of the lumber and pulp segments of the forest industry in 
Canada for the 10-year period ending in 2003 has been mixed. Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE)3 for the lumber segment averaged 9.6% fluctuating from a high of 
3 A measure of the returns that a company is realizing from its capital. Calculated as profit before interest 
and tax divided by the difference between total assets and current liabilities. The resulting ratio represents 
the efficiency with which capital is being utilized to generate profit. 
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27% in 1994 to a low of negative 6% in 2003. The single largest market for Canadian 
lumber is the United States. Industry returns in 2002 and 2003 have been negatively 
impacted by countervailing and anti-dumping duties levied by the United States 
government. 
Return on Capital Employed 
Lumber Industry in Canada 
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Figure 1. Return on capital employed in the lumber industry in Canada for the ten year 
period 1994-2003. 
SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE 
The United States is the largest and most important market for softwood lumber 
exports from British Columbia. Exports from Canada to the U.S . rose from 3 billion 
board feet or 7% of U.S. market consumption in 1952 to more than 18 billion board feet 
or approximately 33% share in the late 1990s. Between 1996 and 2001 trade in softwood 
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lumber was managed under the Softwood Lumber Agreement, a voluntary export 
restraint agreement between the two countries. 
Upon expiry of the agreement with the United States on April2, 2001 , the U.S. 
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (an ad hoc industry association in the United States) 
filed a countervailing duty petition and its first anti-dumping petition against Canadian 
softwood lumber. 
Under U.S. trade law, a countervailing duty case is an investigation of an alleged 
subsidy that provides an importer with an advantage in the U.S. market. With lumber, the 
U.S. contends that provincial stumpage and log export restrictions provide a subsidy to 
lumber producers. 
An anti-dumping case is an investigation on whether an importer is selling goods 
in the U.S. at prices lower than in the home market or is selling goods at prices below 
cost. 
In 2002 the U.S . Department of Commerce (DOC) issued its final determination 
in the countervailing and antidumping investigations, which resulted in a countervailing 
duty ("CVD") rate of 18.79% and an antidumping duty ("ADD") of 8.43% being applied 
to softwood exports from Canada. 
The federal government of Canada, various provincial governments, industry 
associations and in some cases individual companies all filed appeals, objections and 
complaints under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and U.S. trade law. The government of Canada also pursued 
negotiations with the United States in an attempt to resolve the dispute. 
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On August 10, 2005 a NAFf A Extraordinary Challenge Committee unanimously 
upheld a NAFf A panel ruling that the evidence does not support a threat of injury by 
Canadian imports and confirmed the panel's instruction that the U.S. find no threat of 
injury. The ruling was expected to result in the removal of the CVD and ADD and a 
refund of cash deposits with interest. The U.S. has refused to comply with the ruling. 
Effective December 12, 2005, the CVD deposit rates were reduced to 8.70% and 
the ADD rates were set at 2.11 %, as a result of the final determination in the second 
Administrative Review. 
No resolution has been reached in the dispute and it does not appear that one is 
close at hand. 
INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION 
The reaction of Canadian producers has been to consolidate in order to achieve 
economies of scale by increasing production in order to reduce unit costs. The two largest 
transactions consolidating manufacturers in Northern B.C. were the acquisition of Slocan 
Forest Products Ltd. by Canadian Forest Products Ltd. (Canfor), and the acquisition of 
Weldwood of Canada Ltd. by West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. (WFf). The two remaining 
firms now control 64% of lumber manufacturing capacity4 and 73% of pulp 
manufacturing capacity in the Northern Interior Forest Region. 
Consolidation is also a worldwide industry trend with companies looking for the 
following benefits: 
• Operating synergies by leveraging best practices, re-allocating production 
from high cost to low cost plants, focusing specialized products to specific 
4 Mills with a capacity of more than I 0 million board feet of lumber per year. 
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mills avoiding inefficiencies related to grade changes, minimizing 
transportation costs for raw materials and finished products, and removing 
duplicate fixed overhead costs. 
• Ability to remove redundant assets (close plants) without losing 
customers. 
• Due to industry business cycles, seize opportunities to buy assets at a 
cheaper price than building. 
• Rationalize capital spending with the combined entity investing in a 
project rather than two projects proceeding. After a combination only the 
best projects tend to proceed. 
• Greater size tends to allow companies to achieve a lower overall cost of 
capital. 
• Customer and supplier growth creates an incentive for companies to grow 
in order to provide a counterweight. At an industry level, greater 
concentration makes it easier to manage inventory levels through 
production curtailments ensuring supply meets demand leading to greater 
price stability. 
The two key product markets- pulp and lumber- that Northern B.C. industry 
competes in have low concentration (Roberts, et al 2005). The top five producers have 
less than 30% of the lumber capacity and 40% of the market pulp capacity leading to 
greater price volatility. In general if the top four producers own less than 40% of the 
market the industry is considered to be very competitive with a number of other firms 
competing but none owning a very large portion of the market. 
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NORTHEN INTERIOR LUMBER CAPACITY 
Despite the softwood lumber dispute5, total sawmill capacity in British Columbia 
has increased by 7% over the last five years with the average sawmill capacity increasing 
by 24% to 161 million board feet per year. The Northern Interior Region sawmill 
capacity in 2004 was 6.9 billion board feet per year or 44% of the total sawmill capacity 
in the province. The average capacity of the medium and large6 size sawmills in the north 
is 208 million board feet per year or 54% higher than the average sawmill in the 
remainder of the province. The north is home to the six sawmills in the province that 
have capacity exceeding 300 million board feet per year; of which three are "super mills" 
with a capacity exceeding 400 million board feet per year. 
5 The di spute may have been responsible for the capacity dec line in 2003 . 
6 Medium and large size mill s defined as lumber mill s with estimated capacity over 40 million board feet 
per year. 
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Figure 2. Average capacity of medium 
and large size sawmills in British 
Columbia for the five year period 2000-
2004. 
Figure 3. Total capacity of medium and 
large size sawmills in British Columbia 
for the five year period 2000-2004. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers has calculated that manufacturing costs per unit 
decrease as capacity increases making larger mills more cost competitive. Using this 
measure, Northern British Columbia has a competitive advantage due to mill size. 
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Relative Direct and Indirect 
Manufacturing Costs by Mill Size 
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Figure 4. Relative direct and indirect manufacturing costs by mill size. 
PULP PROFITABILITY 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) for the pulp segment in Canada averaged 
3.2% over the 10-year period from 1994 to 2003 fluctuating from a high of 17% in 1995 
to a low of negative 6% in 1996. This is a substandard rate of return. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimates the cost of capital for the forest industry in Canada at 
9% to 12% (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2004). With the pulp industry not earning its cost 
of capital reinvestment to maintain or enhance the assets will not take place and 
competitiveness will decline. 
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Figure 5. Return on capital employed in the pup industry in Canada for the 10 years 
1994-2003. 
Pulp capacity in Canada peaked in the year 2000 and has been declining over the 
last five years. The spike in capacity coincides with the increased returns in 2000. As the 
return on capital employed hovered in the 1% - 3% range pulp capacity declined. 
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Chemical Paper Grade Market Pulp 
Practical Maximum Capacity Canada 
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September 2005. 
Figure 6. Chemical paper grade market pulp practical maximum capacity in Canada for 
the ten year period 1995-2004. 
GLOBAL PULP MARKETS 
Wood pulp is a globally traded commodity, with tonnes sold on the open market 
referred to as market pulp. In 2003, 93.0 percent of the world's market pulp deliveries 
consisted of chemical pulp, and the remaining 7.0 percent was high yield (mechanical) 
pulp. World demand for market pulp reached 43 million tonnes in 2003, up by 4.4 
percent compared to the previous year. Most of this demand growth came from China 
(+770 000 tonnes) and Western Europe (+480 000 tonnes). 
Canada was the world's largest market pulp supplier in 2003, with 44 mills 
accounting for 22 percent of global capacity. Canadian market pulp deliveries reached 
10.2 million tonnes in the year. The U.S. was the second largest market pulp supplier, 
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with 17 percent of global market pulp capacity in 2003 . U.S . market pulp deliveries 
reached 7.6 million tonnes. 
On a regional basis, deliveries to the U.S. and Japan declined by 4.6 percent and 
3.6 percent respectively from 2002. The most significant gain was reported in shipments 
to Asia! Africa, up 13 percent. 
Table 1. Total world chemical paper grade market pulp 2003 practical maximum 
capacity and demand. 
Total World Chemical Paper Grade Market Pulp 
2003 Practical Maximum Capacity and Demand 
('000 of tonnes) 
Region 
North America 
Western Europe 
Central Europe/Russia 
Latin America 
Japan 
Other Asia/Africa (1) 
China 
South Korea 
TOTAL 
Supply 
17,695 
11,480 
3,500 
7,590 
915 
5,905 
47,085 
Demand 
7,250 
17,350 
1,975 
1,985 
2,675 
4,235 
5,085 
2,700 
43,255 
Balance 
10,445 
(5,870) 
1,525 
5,605 
(1 ,760) 
1,670 
(5,085) 
(2 ,700) 
3,830 
(1) Supply for Other Asia/Africa includes China and South Korea. Demand for those two countries is 
shown separately because it is so large. Africa has very little suppl y/demand. 
Source: Pulp and Paper Products Council "World Paper Grade Market Pulp Supply and Demand", 
October 2004. 
Table 1 above highlights two issues. First, there is a world supply imbalance 
creating supplying regions and consuming regions. The largest supplying regions are 
North America and Latin America, and the largest consuming regions are Western 
Europe and Asia (adding together Other Asia/Africa, China and South Korea there is a 
net consumption of 6,115,000 tonnes). This highlights the fact that pulp trade flows from 
the net supplying regions to the net consuming regions. 
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The second issue highlighted is that demand was 91.4% of supply capacity in 
2003. The excess capacity creates a spirited marketplace where producers compete for 
market share that ultimately reduces the price. 
In a fragmented, oversupplied market the price will decline until enough supply is 
removed to balance supply and demand. This dynamic has created the low returns for the 
Canadian pulp industry. The delivered cost curve below shows that mills in Latin 
America and the United States had a delivered cost advantage, and that many mills in 
Canada are at the high end of the curve. 
US$/ADMT 
7QQ Depreciation, interest and 
taxes are not included. 
Cdn$ = 0.725 
Euro = 1.125 US$ 
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3rd Quarter 2003 
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Source: NLK Consultants Inc., Market Kraft Cost Analysis, Third Quarter, 2003 
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Figure 7. Bleached softwood market kraft delivered cost for the curve 3rd quarter 2003 . 
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MOUNTAIN PINE BEETLE 
In British Columbia's central interior, a mountain pine beetle infestation has been 
spreading since 1994. The mountain pine beetle (MPB) is an insect that attacks lodgepole 
pine and is widely considered to be the most damaging of all the insects that attack 
lodgepole pine in western Canada. The insect kills mature trees by boring through the 
bark and interrupting the flow of nutrients up the tree stem. 
The current infestation is unprecedented in recorded history. During the last 
several years, both the rate of spread and the intensity of the attack have increased 
exponentially. Recent timber supply analyses indicate that the availability of timber in the 
long term will be adversely affected. 
Table 2. Estimated merchantable volume (millions m3) of beetle-killed pine on the 
timber harvesting land base in the Lakes and Prince George Timber Supply Areas 
TSA 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Lakes 0.3 1 4 9 16 21 25 30 34 38 42 
PG 5 7 10 21 38 59 79 100 127 141 158 
Region 5.3 8 14 30 54 80 104 130 161 179 200 
Source: Prince George Timber Supply Area: Rationale for Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) Determination 
Effective October I, 2004, Larry Pederson, Chief Forester, Province of British Columbia. 
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The outbreak has reached a stage where scientists believe that only two things can stop it: 
• A winter low of -40°C or a sudden cold snap in early fall or late spring of-
25°C would reduce beetle populations enough to end the outbreak. 
• A depletion of susceptible hosts - all available lodgepole pine trees have 
been infected. 
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In the short-term annual allowable cut (AAC) levels throughout the central 
interior have been increased by 60% to mitigate the adverse effect of the infestation. The 
AAC in the Prince George TSA prior to the infestation was 9.4 million cubic metres 
annually. In 2004 the AAC was increased to 14.9 million cubic meters. By 2010 it is 
estimated that in the Northern Interior Forest Region it would take more than 14 years of 
harvesting at the increased rate to remove the infected trees. 
Studies have found that there is a rapid degrade of beetle kill wood in the first one 
to two years post-mortality due to bluestain fungus 7, reduced moisture content and 
checking. Volume recovery from dead trees remains high, although lumber appearance 
suffers due to the bluestain fungus and checking. The literature and observations suggest 
that standing trees will fall to the ground before decay losses become substantial. It is 
estimated that standing trees will start to decay and will begin falling in seven to ten years 
(Lewis and Hartley 2005). 
The impact on pulping requires more study, although it is clear that dry wood 
increases pin chips and fines making continuous digester operation a challenge and 
decreasing yield (Watson 2005). This will increase costs for pulp producers using these 
wood chips in Northern British Columbia. 
ISSUES FACING THE NORTHERN B.C. FOREST INDUSTRY 
The forest industry in Northern British Columbia is part of a larger Canadian 
forest industry that sells its products in international markets, with competitors from other 
regions of the world. The financial performance of the Canadian lumber industry shows 
7 
Pathogenic blue-stain fungi associated with the mountain pine beetle assist the beetles in exhausting tree 
defences and killing trees. The fungi colonize the sapwood and produce a blue stain discoloring the wood. 
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that it is earning its cost of capital (as estimated by PriceWaterhouseCoopers), while the 
Canadian pulp industry is not. The pulp industry in Northern British Columbia was 
established to allow fuller utilization of the regions forests . The two segments are now 
closely intertwined and must earn their cost of capital to attract reinvestment and remain 
competitive. 
Two companies, Canadian Forest Products Ltd. (Canfor) and West Fraser Timber 
Co. Ltd. (West Fraser) dominate sawmill and pulp mill capacity in the north. If these 
firms can be used as a proxy for the forest industry in the Northern Interior, a close 
examination of the performance of these companies could give insight into the 
profitability of the northern industry. Both of these companies operate lumber, pulp and 
panel manufacturing facilities. Are these companies earning their cost of capital? Are 
each of the product lines earning their cost of capital? In order to answer these questions 
the cost of capital for these companies and product lines must be calculated and 
compared to the actual returns that the firms have generated. 
COST OF CAPITAL 
An organization raises financial capital in order to finance its assets and 
operations. The cost of capital is the rate of return required to compensate providers of 
those funds . This rate of return serves as a benchmark to evaluate the firm's performance 
and also serves as the discount rate for decision-making regarding capital investments. 
Investments must at least return the cost of capital for the firm to properly compensate 
providers of the investment funds (Armitage 2005). 
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The financial capital of an organization consists of the two main components debt 
and equity. Debt financing is money that is borrowed to run the business. Long-term debt 
financing usually applies to assets a business is purchasing, such as equipment, buildings, 
land, or machinery. With long-term debt financing, the scheduled repayment of the loan 
more or less matches the estimated useful life of the assets purchased with the 
borrowings. Interest payments are set by contract so the lender knows how much the 
interest payments will be and when they will be made. The lending contract also specifies 
what occurs if the interest payments are not made as agreed, including the lender taking 
position of the assets in order to satisfy the outstanding obligation. 
Equity financing is money acquired from the shareholders or business owners 
themselves. As owners of the business they have the right to the "residual" or money left 
after all other claims on the business have been satisfied. Shareholders are compensated 
through dividends and through the increased value of their shares when the firm retains 
earnings to reinvest in the business. 
The cost of capital is meant to compensate investors for time and risk. The cost of 
debt is normally transparent and therefore easier to determine than the cost of equity. The 
cost of equity is composed of the rate for time (the "risk free rate"8) and compensation for 
risk- the "risk premium". Risk is the chance that an investment's actual return will be 
different than expected. This includes the possibility of losing some or all of the original 
investment. 
The decomposition of security risk into di versifiable (or uns ystemic) and 
undiversifiable (or systemic) risks has emerged from the portfolio approach to capital 
investment. The diversifiable risk can be reduced or eliminated through diversification of 
8 In practice the risk-free rate is often assumed to be the short-term Treasury note rate. 
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securities or assets (Ben-Horim and Levy 1980) while undiversifiable risk cannot be 
diversified. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) can be used to estimate the return 
required for the providers of equity capital to the firm (Armitage 2005). The components 
of the model include the risk-free rate (to compensate for time), the risk premium 
demanded by equity investors (the return generated by the stock market for all equity 
investments) and an adjusting factor for the firm called the "market beta". Beta is 
typically estimated with time-series regression, in which the dependant variable is the 
equity stock return and the independent variable is the market return. Variability in the 
market return is referred to as systemic risk, while variability in the return of an 
individual security in relation to the market is unsystemic or diversifiable risk. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model was the first apparently successful attempt to 
show how to assess the risk of the cash flow from a potential investment project. 
Historical returns from various types of assets show that assets with higher average 
returns also had more variable returns (Jagannathan and McGrattan 1995). This 
correspondence suggests that the higher average returns were compensation for the 
perceived higher risk. The asset classes measured for the 66-year period 1926 to 1991 
were (in order of increasing volatility and return) U.S. Treasury Bills, U.S. Treasury 
Bonds, Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500-stock index, and small-firm stocks. 
Empirical studies of data for stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
during 1931-65 (Black, Jensen and Scholes 1972) and 1926-68 (Fama and MacBeth 
1973) concluded that the data generally supports the CAPM. 
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Subsequent studies using two groups of stocks segregated based on firm size, yet 
with identical betas, showed a statistically significant bias in returns with the smaller 
firms earning a higher rate of return. This seemed to suggest that the CAPM was missing 
firm size as a significant factor. 
Studies have also been conducted on shorter time periods. The period 1976-80 
showed unusually high returns for small-stocks and Treasury bonds did poorly. During 
the period 1981-91 small-stock returns were lower than the S&P stocks yet the two types 
of assets had approximately the same beta value. This study also identified a size effect, 
and the ratio of book-to-market equity that seemed to do a better job of explaining cross-
sectional variation in average asset returns. Questions have been raised about the data 
bias in this study. Empirical support has been found for the CAPM over long periods of 
time, and there are periods of time in which it is not found. 
The reaction has been that since the CAPM is only an abstraction from reality it is 
unreasonable to expect it to be exactly right, and that the systemic deviations are not 
economically important enough to reject it. 
The CAPM formula allows the calculation of the firm's cost of equity capital. The 
cost of debt capital is determined by the trading value of outstanding debt in the 
marketplace, or the interest rate on bank debt. With this information the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (W ACC) can be calculated, giving the rate of return the 
company must earn on its assets in order to compensate investors. 
Fuller and Kerr (1981), Gup and Norwood (1982) and Block (2003) among others 
suggest that the firm's cost of capital may not be the appropriate screening rate to 
evaluate investment proposals in multi-division firms where the divisions have 
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substantially different degrees of risk. To the extent that divisions in a corporation have 
degrees of risk and financial characteristics that are different from the parent corporation, 
using the overall hurdle rate is certain to lead to incorrect decisions and failure to 
maximize stockholder wealth. The major consequence of using a single hurdle rate for all 
projects is a misallocation of capital since the acceptance rule is biased in favour of the 
acceptance of high-risk projects. Low-risk divisions may not receive capital despite their 
ability to generate projects offering returns in excess of those required for the risk 
involved. The answer is to develop risk-adjusted hurdle rates for each division in a multi-
division firm, such as a firm with pulp, lumber and panel divisions . 
The challenge is to determine the beta required since the stock for the entire firm 
is traded on the stock market, and therefore the beta for the firm reflects the returns 
required for all divisions. Because market data for the divisions is not directly available 
several proxy methods have been proposed. 
The "pure play" technique proposed by Fuller and Kerr (1981) requires the 
identification of at least one publicly traded, single industry firm to serve as a proxy for a 
given division. The unleveraged market beta for the firm is then used. Fuller and Kerr 
found that "For our sample, a weighted average of pure-play betas closely approximated 
the observed beta of the multi-division firm in question. This result suggests that the 
pure-play technique is, in fact, a valid procedure for estimating the betas of a division". 
The difficulty with this technique is finding one or more single product firms that closely 
match the products and risks of the division. In those situations where more than one pure 
play can be found and there is wide variation in the betas of the firms, confidence in the 
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technique is undermined since presumably the unleveraged betas should be identical for 
the group of proxy companies. 
Gup and Norwood (1982) proposed combining a measure of objective and 
subjective risk in order to estimate the cost of capital. The objective component is a 
measure of the variability of net operating profits after taxes (NOPAT). The subjective 
component is a management judgment of the relative risk of a list of identified "risk 
elements". Each element is rated relative to the parent company's risk. The combination 
of the two elements yields a "Combined Risk Class" that identifies a hurdle rate that is 
relatively higher or lower than the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for the 
firm (in their example 0.90 to 1.20 times). This method recognizes the relative risk of 
each division and allows the setting of different hurdle rates, but the hurdle rates are not 
calculated from market betas, and can be subject to management bias. 
Butka, Kemper and Schiereck (2004) tested the Gup and Norwood approach, 
along with another heuristic approach, on a number of manufacturing companies traded 
on the German stock exchange. Risk indexes were created based on a number of criteria 
and compared to market risk measures. The study results indicated that the risk measures 
provided some explanation for the capital market risk measures; however, the results 
proved to have no general applicability. 
The CAPM is a single risk factor model and that risk factor is assumed to be the 
market portfolio. Arbitrage pricing theory (APT) allows more than one return generating 
factor. According to Roll and Ross (1980) "The APT demonstrates that since any market 
equilibrium must be consistent with no arbitrage profits, every equilibrium will be 
characterized by a linear relationship between each asset's expected return and its 
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return's response amplitudes, or loadings, on the common factors". The attractiveness of 
this model is that if these factors can be identified and measured it will more accurately 
describe the assets required returns. Roll and Ross conducted an empirical investigation 
of the APT and their technique of factor analysis identified the existence of three factors 
that influence returns, but did not attempt to identify what those factors are. 
Some of the questions that researchers have examined are (Armitage): 
• How many common factors are there? 
• What are the common factors (in economic terms)? 
• How well do multifactor models with pre-specified common factors or 
proxies for them explain the cross-section and time series of observed 
returns? 
• How well do multifactor models compare with the CAPM? 
The current weakness of the APT and other multi-factor models are the added 
complexity and doubt about exactly which variables to include. Researchers have not 
satisfactorily answered the questions above. 
Another technique is the "accounting beta". This measure is computed by running 
a time series regression of the companies "basic earning power" (EBIT9ffotal Assets) 
against returns on the market index. The assumption is that the systemic volatility in 
earnings would be one factor determining the systemic volatility in the market price. 
Beaver and Mane gold ( 197 5) found a statistically significant association between market 
betas and accounting betas, however they concluded that the accounting beta appears to 
be only one of the explanatory factors of the market beta. Kulkarni, Powers and Shannon 
9 Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
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(1991) have proposed a method of calculating accounting betas by division (or product 
line) and then adjusting or reconciling the divisional betas to the market beta of the firm. 
Since there is an imperfect association between accounting betas and market betas the 
market also considers factors other than accounting earnings. Using the Kulkarni et al 
method these other factors are implicitly distributed in a neutral manner to each division. 
They argue that such an assumption is valid because there are risk factors over which 
divisional managers have no control. For example a firm's overall risk is influenced by 
its capital structure, but this decision is not made at the divisional level. An advantage of 
the proposed method is its objectivity, and the calculated hurdle rates are tied back to 
market risk. 
Kulkarni et al note that the estimated beta of individual firm product lines using a 
limited sample of data may have potentially large estimation errors. For this reason 
aggregate product-line betas should be used to minimize measurement error and provide 
a superior basis for allocating the firm's cost of capital across divisions. This requires 
identifying firms in substantially the same business and accounting beta information that 
is not readily available. This method has the same drawbacks as the pure-play technique 
proposed by Fuller and Kerr (finding proxy firms) with the additional complication of 
requiring calculations to identify the accounting beta. 
The discussion concerning CAPM, APT, heuristic risk models and accounting 
betas are methods of identifying the appropriate rate of return for an equity investment in 
a risky asset. Borrowing, from whatever source, while maintaining a fixed amount of 
equity, increases the risk to the equity investor. Therefore the covariance of the asset's 
return with the market portfolio's rate of return (the asset "beta") should be greater for 
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the stock of a firm with a higher debt-equity ratio than for the stock of another firm in the 
same risk class with a lower debt equity ratio (Hamada 1972). How much difference does 
capital structure make and should it be taken into account? 
Modigliani and Miller ( 1958) looked at this question and came up with several 
proposals. Proposition I states that the market value of any firm is independent of its 
capital structure, or said another way, the average cost of capital to any firm is 
completely independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a 
pure equity stream of its class. Proposition II states that the expected yield of a share of 
stock is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate for a pure equity stream in the class, 
plus a premium related to the financial risk. Proposition III states that regardless of the 
financing used, the marginal cost of capital to a firm is equal to the average cost of 
capital, which in turn is equal to the capitalization rate for an unlevered stream in the 
class to which the firm belongs. These propositions assumed a world of no tax and 
perfect capital markets. 
Hamada ( 1972) tested the Modigliani and Miller Propositions I and II and found 
results supported the propositions. He estimated that 21 to 24% of the observed systemic 
risk of common stocks can be explained merely by the added financial risk taken on by 
the underlying firm with its use of debt and preferred stock. His conclusion is that 
corporate leverage does count considerably. 
Fuller and Kerr (1981), in testing the pure-play technique for beta estimation of a 
division, concluded that differences between the division's and pure-play's capital 
structure can be disregarded when estimating the divisional beta since the pure play 
proxy betas (unadjusted for differences in leverage) provided better estimates of the 
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multidivision firm betas than did the leverage adjusted proxy betas. They did caution that 
this result is inconsistent with other studies and would require further validation. Their 
recommended procedure for estimating the overall cost of capital for a division would be 
to: 
1. Use a pure play beta to estimate the divisional beta and thus the divisional 
cost of equity capital. 
2. Use the overall cost of debt for the firm as the divisional cost of debt. 
3. Use an internally-generated target debt ratio as the divisional debt ratio. 
METHODOLOGY 
Since Canfor and West Fraser now control 64% of lumber manufacturing capacity 
and 73% of pulp manufacturing capacity in the Northern Interior Forest Region, These 
companies will be used as a proxy for the forest industry in the north. Shares of both of 
these firms have been traded on the Toronto stock exchange for a number of years. The 
review of methods for calculating the appropriate rate of return for a risky asset showed 
that no method has yet been discovered that identifies and captures all of the factors that 
influence the returns expected by equity investors. The information required to use 
CAPM is readily available and although elements of this model have been questioned, it 
has been proven as a valid pricing tool so this method will be used. 
In order to calculate divisional or product line cost of capital the Fuller 
and Kerr method of "pure-play" proxy betas will be used to price the equity capital. For 
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each product line an equivalent firm trading on the Toronto stock exchange will be 
identified and its stock beta will be used in the CAPM formula to calculate the equity cost 
of capital. 
Since Modigliani and Miller as well as Hamada both found that capital structure 
will have an impact on the value of equity securities, the "pure-play" proxy firm betas 
will be adjusted for leverage to calculate the underlying asset beta, and then re-leveraged 
at the target debt ratio for Canfor and West Fraser as suggested by Fuller and Kerr. 
The following steps will be used to determine if the target firms are earning their 
cost of capital. 
1. Calculate the Weighted Average Cost of Capital. 
a. Calculate the cost of equity. 
b. Calculate the cost of debt. 
2. Calculate the actual return on capital to compare to the W ACC. 
a. Compare book share value to market share value. 
These calculations will determine the cost of capital and the actual rates of return for 
all product lines of the two firms. Comparing book share value to market share value is 
an interesting indicator of whether the market believes that the firms selected are earning 
returns that support their book value. 
Proceeding further, the weighted average cost of capital will be calculated for each 
product line. As described earlier, proxy betas will be used to calculate required returns 
on equity and existing debt ratios are assumed to be the target debt ratios to calculate the 
product W ACC. 
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The following formula will be used to calculate W ACC (Armitage 2005): 
WACC = REt-EuVL + Ro(1- Tc)DNL 
Where: 
REL =Expected rate of return on levered equity after corporation tax. 
EL= Market Value of Equity given a leverage L. 
V L = Market Value (equity + debt) of the firm levered. 
R0 = Cost of debt for levered debt. 
T c =Effective corporate tax rate. 
D = Market Value of debt. 
The most difficult variable to determine is the expected return on equity. The CAPM 
formula will be used to calculate the required equity returns. Following is the CAPM 
formula for the equity cost calculation (Armitage 2005): 
REL = RF + ~dE(RM) - RF] 
Where: 
REL =Expected rate of return on levered equity after corporation tax. 
RF = Risk-free rate of interest. 
~L= Leveraged Beta of the equity. 
E(RM) = Expected return on the market portfolio. 
The CAPM is a single period model while forest industry investment is 
undertaken with a long-term horizon. In order to recognize the long-term horizon, the risk 
free rate must be the return expected on long-term government bonds. The average return 
on long-term Government of Canada bonds during the January 2000 to February 2006 
period is 5.31 % per year (Appendix 1). 
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Since Canfor and WFT are both listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
their betas will be calculated using that index as the independent variable. Berkowitz and 
Qiu (2001) calculated the average monthly stock market risk premium over the period of 
February 1982 to June 1999 or 209 months. The firms in the sample were those having 
data available on both the Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre Database 
(CFMRC) and the Compustat Canadian Database over the January 1982 through 
December 1999 period. Their proxy for the market factor is the total monthly return on 
the CFMRC value weighted portfolio less the 30-day return on T -Bills 10• The calculated 
return for the market factor is 4. 71 % per year. 
The market value of equity is used when calculating the Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital. The formula for determining the market value of equity is: 
Market Value of Equity = Number of shares issued x Market value per share 
The market value per share fluctuates as investors are willing to pay more or less 
for a share of the firm. In order to remove daily fluctuations in the value of shares, a 
monthly average price will be used to calculate the market value of equity. The study 
period is the five years 2000- 2004. The average market price of an equity share during 
the month of January, 2005 will be used in order to reflect all of the events occurring 
during the study period. 
10 
Berkowitz and Qiu (200 l) comment "The CFMRC value weighted portfolio consists of 3361 domestic 
common equities. The return on the TSE300 composite was also used to represent the market with 
negligible differences from the results reported in the paper." 
38 
As mentioned, the Toronto Stock Exchange will be used to calculate the stock 
betas of Canfor and West Fraser to be used in the CAPM equation. Since both the 
company stock and the exchange values change on a daily basis, the stock beta will 
change over time. The correlation is typically based on a two or three year time period. 
For the purposes of this study the betas for all firms are from RBC Investments Action 
Direct Online Investing website on March 18, 2006. The source is a respected financial 
services firm in Canada. Although the beta used is not directly from the study period, the 
nature of betas is that they do not change materially over short periods of time unless 
affected by significant events. There have been no such events affecting the firms used in 
this study. 
The actual cost of debt can be used in the W ACC calculation if the interest rates 
reflect current market rates for the risk class to which the firm belongs. Otherwise the 
debt must be adjusted to match current market rates. 
This method will allow the calculation of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, 
or the returns the firms must earn in order to compensate the providers of debt and equity 
funds. 
Comparing the market value of the firm to the book value of capital employed 
shows whether the firm is earning the expected returns. Assuming the value of the firm is 
dictated by the expected future cash flows, a market value in excess of the book value 
capital employed implies that the firm is earning returns that exceed its cost of capital. 
Conversely, if the market value is below book value, the firm is not earning returns that 
adequately compensate the providers of capital. 
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Looking further into the cost of capital for Canfor and WFf, it can be broken 
down into their three divisions, Lumber, Panel and Pulp. Using the Fuller and Kerr 
(1981) methodology, a proxy firm for each of the divisions will be used to determine the 
appropriate beta for the CAPM formula. Since the leverage used by proxy firms may be 
different than Canfor or WFf, the unleveraged betas (or asset betas) will be calculated 
using the following formula: 
Where: 
~u = Unleveraged Beta of the equity. 
V L = Market Value (equity + debt) of the firm levered. 
EL = Market Value of Equity given a leverage L. 
~L =Leveraged Beta of the equity. 
Continuing with the methodology recommended by Fuller and Kerr ( 1981 ), the 
asset beta can then be leveraged at the ratio for Canfor and WFf using existing 
leveraging as the target for the firms and using the overall cost of debt to the firm as the 
divisional cost of debt and in this way calculate the divisional W ACC. 
Finally, the actual rates of return for the firms and for each division will be 
calculated using the following formula: 
RBA= NOPAT I BA 
Where: 
RBA =Return on Book Assets 
NOPAT =Net Operating Profit After Tax 
BA = Book Asset value 
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APPLICATION TO NORTHERN B.C. COMPANIES 
Canfor Corporation is an integrated forest products company with operations 
primarily in British Columbia and is listed on the Toronto stock exchange (CFP). John 
Prentice and Poldi Bentley founded the company in 1938 in New Westminster, B.C. 
Canfor became a public company on June 27, 1983. 
Canfor produces softwood lumber, northern bleached softwood kraft pulp 
(NBSK), bleached chemi-thermo mechanical pulp (BCTMP), kraft paper, plywood, 
remanufactured lumber products, oriented strand board (OSB), hardboard paneling and 
other wood products. All of these facilities are supplied with timber from Canfor's forest 
operations in British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec. The forest operations are located 
almost exclusively on public lands held under long-term forest tenure agreements with 
the province of British Columbia. 
Canfor is the largest producer of SPF (Spruce-Pine-Fir) lumber in the world, with 
annual production of 5.2 billion board feet. This is accomplished through 19 sawmills in 
British Columbia, two in Alberta and one in Quebec. The company also operates three 
remanufacturing facilities, two in BC and one in Washington State. As well, the 
company operates three finger-joint plants, two in BC and one in Alberta. 
Canfor is also one of the largest producers of NBSK in Canada with two pulp 
mills and one pulp and paper mill located in Prince George, BC. As well Canfor owns a 
BCTMP pulp mill in Taylor BC. Canfor owns 50% of an NBSK pulp and newspaper 
plant in Howe Sound. Canfor has written off its investment in this mill and its financial 
results are not consolidated with Canfor. 
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Panel production at Canfor is through two plywood plants, one in Prince George 
and one in Fort Nelson as well as an OSB plant in Fort Nelson. The company is also a 
50% partner in a new OSB plant being constructed in Fort StJohn that is expected to 
begin production in the fall of 2005. 
To provide fibre to these plants, Canfor has 13 million cubic meters of forest 
tenure. 
In April, 2004 Canfor acquired Slocan Forest Products Ltd., another forestry 
company with extensive operations in British Columbia. By the end of 2004, Canfor 
owned 45% of lumber capacity, 55% of pulp capacity, and 41% of panel capacity in the 
Northern Interior B.C. forest district- a dominant position (appendix 2 and 3). The 
Slocan acquisition increased Canfor' s northern interior lumber capacity from 33% to 
45%, pulp capacity from 46% to 55% and panel capacity from 7% to 41%. The Slocan 
acquisition only impacts 2004 financial results from April 1 forward. Prior to the Slocan 
acquisition Canfor owned a material portion of the Northern Interior capacity and 
therefore makes a good proxy for the industry in the north. 
Table 3. Canfor Corporation and Slocan Forest Products Ltd. geographic distribution of 
manufacturing capacity by product line. 
Mill Operations and Capacities 
Cantor Slocan Combined 
Lumber North 75% 49% 66% 
Lumber Other 25% 51% 34% 
Pulp North 100% 100% 100% 
Pulp Other 0% 0% 0% 
Panel North 100% 100% 100% 
Panel Other 0% 0% 0% 
Canfor and Slocan also own operations outside of Northern British Columbia. 
Table 3 shows the proportion of each company's manufacturing capacity that is located 
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in Northern British Columbia. Prior to the Slocan purchase, 75% of Canfor's lumber 
manufacturing capacity was in the north, 100% of pulp and 100% of panels. This again 
makes Canfor a good proxy for the Northern British Columbia Forest Industry. 
West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. is an integrated forest products company with 
operations primarily in British Columbia and Alberta and is listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (WFT). West Fraser began operations in 1955 when three brothers Henry H. 
Ketcham Jr., William P. Ketcham, and Samuel K. Ketchum paid $15,000 to acquire a 
small lumber planing mill in Quesnel, British Columbia. In 1957, the brothers were 
approached with an offer to take over a near bankrupted mill near Williams Lake, B.C. 
This acquisition led to the beginning of West Fraser Timber Company, which is the name 
the company continues to use today. The company continued to expand its operations 
from 1957 to 1979 through the acquisition of sawmills and timber rights in the interior of 
British Columbia. In 1979 West Fraser entered the pulp industry by forming a joint 
venture with the Japanese company Daishowa. Together these two companies 
constructed and operated Quesnel River Pulp, in Quesnel B.C. West Fraser continued its 
expansion when it acquired a 40% interest in Eurocan Pulp and Paper Co., in 1981 . This 
moved the company into the kraft paper and containerboard market and as well included 
interest in two joint venture sawmills and two independent sawmills. In 1985 Hank 
Ketchum III became President and CEO of West Fraser, and a year later he took the 
company public. By 1993, West Fraser had expanded its ownership in Eurocan Pulp and 
Paper Co. to 100%. During this time, West Fraser also entered into a joint venture to 
construct and operate a newsprint mill at Whitecourt, Alberta. In 1995, the company 
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continued to expand their pulp and paper business with the acquisition of the Slave Lake 
Pulp Mill in Alberta. 
In the years after 1995, West Fraser focused on its solid wood business, a return 
to what it considered its core competencies. In 1995, West Fraser acquired the Blue 
Ridge sawmill and the Ranger Board MDF plant both in Blue Ridge, Alberta. In 1996, 
West Fraser developed the WestPine MDF plant in Quesnel. West Fraser acquired 
Zeidler Forest Products in 1999, whose assets included a plywood plant in Edmonton and 
a stud mill and veneer plant in Slave Lake, Alberta (renamed Alberta Plywood). In 2000, 
West Fraser acquired a 50% interest in a sawmill in Red Earth, Alberta. In 2000, West 
Fraser moved across the border with the acquisition of two sawmills in the southern 
United States, located in Joyce, Louisiana and Huttig, Arkansas. 
In 2001 West Fraser acquired a sawmill in Chasm, B.C. from Ainsworth Lumber 
Co. Ltd and converted the existing stud mill into a dimensional lumber sawmill. By the 
end of 2002, West Fraser had increased its ownership in Quesnel River Pulp to 100%. 
On December 31, 2004 West Fraser completed the acquisition of Weldwood of 
Canada Ltd. and became the third largest lumber producer in North America. The 
acquisition included four sawmills that were wholly owned by Weldwood, two in British 
Columbia and two in Alberta. Also acquired was an interest in three joint venture 
sawmills in British Columbia increasing West Fraser's interest in the Burns Lake and 
Decker Lake mills from approximately 32% to 90% and from 50% to 100% in the 
Houston mill. In addition, two plywood plants and a lumber treating facility in British 
Columbia and a laminated veneer lumber plant and lumber treating facility in Alberta 
were added. 
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West Fraser also became a producer of NBSK pulp acquiring a pulp mill in 
Alberta and 50% ownership in a mill in British Columbia. Finally, the addition of 
Weldwood increased West Fraser's timber tenures to 12 million cubic meters of annual 
allowable cut per year. 
Since the acquisition took place at the end of 2004 West Fraser's operating results 
for 2004 and prior years do not include the Weldwood operations. With the Weldwood 
acquisition West Fraser owns 22% of lumber capacity, 19% of pulp capacity, and 0% of 
panel capacity in the Northern Interior B.C. forest district. The Weldwood acquisition 
increased West Fraser's northern interior lumber capacity from 17% to 22%, pulp 
capacity remained unchanged at 19% and panel capacity was also unchanged at 0%. Prior 
to the Weldwood acquisition West Fraser owned a portion of the Northern Interior 
capacity and therefore is influenced by the results of industry in the north. 
Table 4. West Fraser Co. Ltd. and Weldwood of Canada Ltd. geographic distribution of 
manufacturing capacity by product line. 
Mill Operations and Capacities 
West Weld-
Fraser wood Combined 
Lumber North 43% 28% 38% 
Lumber Other 57% 72% 62% 
Pulp North 40% 0% 26% 
Pulp Other 60% 100% 74% 
Panel North 0% 0% 0% 
Panel Other 100% 100% 100% 
Table 4 shows that 43% of West Fraser's lumber capacity and 40% of its pulp and 
paper capacity are in the Northern Interior. 
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Table 5. Calculation of weighted average Table 5 shows the calculation of the 
cost of capital for Canfor and West Fraser 
weighted average cost of capital for 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital Canfor and West Fraser. The capital 
Capital Structure- $Millions structure of both companies is comprised 
Canfor WFT 
Long term debt 213 276 of long-term debt, shareholder equity and 
Other 749 200 
Market Equity 2,216 1,990 
other. Long term debt is money that is Total 3,178 2,466 
Thousands of shares 142,512 42,757 borrowed, is not repayable in the next 
Share market value 15.55 46.54 
year, and requires interest to be paid on the 
Cost of Capital 
Equity borrowed funds. Shareholder equity is 
Risk Free Rate 5.31% 5.31% 
Market Premium 4.71% 4.71% money contributed by the owners, and 
Beta 0.85 0.32 
Cost of equity 9.31% 6.82% previous year earnings not paid out to the 
Long Term Debt 
owners, but retained in the company. L T Debt Interest 8.54% 7.23% 
Income Tax Rate 36.7% 35.6% 
Net of Tax 5.41% 4.66% Other is long term (not payable within the 
Proportion next year) accruals and provisions for 
Long term debt 7% 11% 
Other 24% 8% items such as future income taxes, 
Equity 70% 81% 
Total 100% 100% reforestation, countervailing duties, 
Cost pension and post-retirement benefits. 
Long term debt 5.41% 4.66% 
Other 0.00% 0.00% 
These liabilities do not require the Equity 9.31% 6.82% 
WACC 6.85% 6.02% payment of interest and the companies can 
use these funds without cost until the 
obligations are due. 
The risk free rate and market premium used were discussed earlier. The stock beta is from 
RBC Investments Action Direct Online Investing website on March 18, 2006. The market prices for 
shares are the monthly average for January, 2005 which is shortly after the financial results used in 
the calculations of book return on assets. In other words, the share prices should reflect the company 
performance of the 2004 year just completed. Canfor's weighted average cost of capital at 6.85% is 
higher than West Fraser at 6.02%. Most of the difference is due to Canfor's higher cost of equity 
capital. Canfor has a higher beta which means investors require a higher risk premium for Canfor 
equity. Canfor also has a higher proportion of debt in their capital structure. Higher debt increases 
financial risk and may contribute to Canfor's higher stock beta. 
Canfor's actual average Return on Book Assets over the five year period 2000-2004 was 
5.3%. This indicates that the company did not earn the return required to compensate investors over 
this five year period. The required return is 6.85 %. 
Table 6. Calculation of Canfor Corporation return on assets for the five years 2000-2004 and five 
year average. 
Five Year 
CAN FOR 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Average 
Working Capital* 418 254 277 342 66 271 
Fixed Assets 2219 1444 1395 1436 1484 1596 
Other 292 227 259 266 231 255 
Total Assets 2929 1925 1931 2044 1781 2122 
*Excluding excess cash 
Long term debt 213 478 643 715 401 490 
Other 749 358 334 368 429 448 
Equity 1967 1089 954 961 951 1184 
Total Investment 2929 1925 1931 2044 1781 2122 
Operating Profit 522 -3 55 63 264 180 
NO PAT 331 -2 35 38 156 112 
Return on assets 11.3% -0.1% 1.8% 1.9% 8.8% 5.3% 
NOPAT: Net Operating Profit after Tax 
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Looking at the results for West Fraser over the same five year period the average Return on 
Book Assets was 6.9%. This is higher than West Fraser' s weighted average cost of capital of 6.02%. 
West Fraser as a company has performed better than Canfor and has earned the returns required to 
compensate investors. 
Table 7. Calculation of West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. return on assets for the five years 2000-2004 
and five year average. 
Five Year 
WEST FRASER- $Millions 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Average 
Working Capital* 437 259 307 287 322 322 
Fixed Assets 1214 1246 1318 1332 1274 1277 
Other 104 86 104 223 396 183 
Total Assets 1755 1591 1729 1842 1992 1782 
•Excluding excess cash 
Long term debt 276 287 338 360 571 366 
Other 200 249 267 306 310 266 
Equity 1279 1055 1124 1176 1111 1149 
Total Investment 1755 1591 1729 1842 1992 1782 
•2004 adjusted to exclude Weldwood 
acquisition at year end 
Operating Profit 288 9 209 187 279 194 
NO PAT 185 6 136 113 174 123 
Return on assets 10.6% 0.4% 7.9% 6.1% 8.7% 6.9% 
NOPAT: Net Operating Profit after Tax 
The graphs below compare the market price of Canfor and West Fraser shares to their book 
values over the same five year period (and extending into 2005). The book value shown is the 
closing value at the end of the preceding year. The market values are monthly average trading values 
from Yahoo Finance downloaded on March 15, 2006. 
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Figure 8. Canfor Corporation market 
share price and book value per share for 
the 62 months January 2000 to February 
2006. 
Figure 9. West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. 
market share price and book value per 
share for the 62 months January 2000 to 
February 2006. 
Over the five year period the market values generally track the book values 
closely which supports the previous calculations showing that both Canfor and West 
Fraser have been close to earning their weighted average cost of capital. 
COST OF CAPITAL BY PRODUCT LINE 
Both Canfor and West Fraser have the three major product lines of lumber, pulp 
and panels. These three divisions may have different risk profiles which would lead to a 
different cost of capital since rational investors require higher returns from investments 
that have higher volatility. Using the Fuller and Kerr methodology, a proxy firm is 
required to estimate the market and asset betas for the product lines. The proxy firm must 
trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) because the betas for Canfor and West 
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Fraser were calculated using that exchange. The number of "pure-play" firms conducting 
business in these product lines trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange is very limited. 
The pool is not large. 
The lumber firm chosen is International Forest Products Ltd. (Interfor). The 
Company has operations in British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, including five 
sawmills in the Coastal region of B.C., one in the B.C. Interior, two in Washington and 
one in Oregon. Interfor also operates a number of value-added remanufacturing and 
specialty products facilities in B.C. and Washington. The company was founded in 1963 
and has grown to a rated capacity of 1.2 billion board feet of lumber per year generating 
$833 million in revenue during 2004. 
The pulp firm chosen is SFK Pulp Fund. The company operates a mill located in 
Saint-Felicien, Quebec and employs approximately 325 people. The mill has an annual 
production capacity of 375,000 metric tonnes of high quality northern bleached softwood 
kraft (NBSK) pulp. Management believes the mill is one of the lowest cost producers of 
NBSK in North America. The mill supplies NBSK pulp to various sectors of the paper 
industry in Canada, the United States and in Europe for use in specialty products. 
Revenue in 2004 was $269 million and was generated exclusively by pulp sales. 
The mill commenced operation in 1978 and in 2002 then owner Abitibi 
Consolidated Inc. formed SFK Pulp Fund and sold 70% of the ownership to numerous 
fund holders. 
The Panel firm chosen is Ainsworth Lumber Company Ltd. The company was 
incorporated in 1956 and was the owner of a sawmill operation in 100 Mile House, 
British Columbia. The company grew in lumber until 1993, when it used an Initial Public 
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Offering to raise $51.4 million to build an OSB plant in 100 Mile House. The company 
then continued to grow in Panel products through acquisition and construction. The 
company sold its last sawmill operation in 2001. In 2004 the company generated $909 
million in sales and by year end had manufacturing capacity of 3,355 mmsf of oriented 
strand board (OSB) and 155 mmsf of veneer and plywood. 
Table 8. Calculation of asset or unlevered betas. 
Calculation of Asset Betas 
Lumber Pulp Panel 
Ca~ital Structure-$Millions Cantor WFT Interior SFK Ainsworth 
Long term debt 661 276 74 100 917 
Other 749 200 33 13 79 
Market Equity 2,216 1,990 346 437 455 
Total 3,626 2,466 453 550 1,451 
Shares outstanding 142,512 42,757 48,678 59,250 14,649 
Share market value 15.55 46.54 7.10 7.37 31.05 
Book Equity Value 1,967 1,279 373 461 300 
Equity 61% 81% 76% 79% 31% 
Levered Beta 0.85 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.28 
Unlevered Beta 0.52 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.09 
Table 8 shows the calculation of the unlevered or asset betas by product line. All 
of the betas are very low and the beta for Panel products is exceptionally low. This may 
reflect the very strong panel prices since mid 2003. The market value of equity is the 
average share price during the month of January, 2005 in order to capture the impact of 
2004 operations in share prices. 
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Table 9. Calculation of levered beta by product line for Canfor Corporation. 
Product Line Betas Canfor Lumber Pul~ Panel 
Unlevered beta 0.59 0.24 0.30 0.09 
Levered beta 0.85 0.35 0.43 0.13 
Average assets- $millions 2,122 1,164 902 55 
Asset weighted product levered beta 0.38 
Canfor adjusted levered beta by 
product 0.85 0.78 0.97 0.28 
Applying the unlevered proxy betas to Canfor, and relevering them using 
Canfor' s debt levels as the target debt level for each product line results in product betas 
that are below Canfor's company beta. Calculating a company beta for Canfor using the 
levered proxy betas and a five-year weighted average asset value by product line results 
in a beta that is only half of Canfor's actual company beta (see table above- asset 
weighted levered beta of .38 vs actual beta of .85). Canfor's stock price is significantly 
more volatile than expected given the product lines that Canfor produces. This increases 
the cost of equity capital to Canfor. 
In order to calculate the cost of capital for Canfor by product line the unexplained 
difference in the beta can be allocated to the product lines based on the five-year average 
asset value. This adjusted beta is then used to calculate theW ACC of Canfor by product 
line. Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require that segmented 
information is reported in annual financial reports. That information was used to identify 
assets and net operating profit after tax by product segment for the years 2000 - 2004. 
This actual return on assets can then be compared to the adjusted product line W ACC. 
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Table 10. Comparison of five years 2000-2004 actual return on assets to product line 
W ACC for Canfor Corporation. 
Canfor 2000-2004 Actual Product line 
Return on Assets WACC 
Lumber 5.4% 6.6% 
Panels 24.3% 5.0% 
Pulp 3.8% 7.3% 
Total 5.2% 6.9% 
The return on assets by product line table shows that the panels segment returns 
far exceeded its W ACC. Lumber and pulp did not pay for their cost of capital with pulp 
returning slightly more than half of the required profits on assets. Although lumber fared 
better, that segment was short of required returns by 1.2%. 
Table 11. Calculation of levered beta by product line for West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. 
West 
Product Line Betas Fraser Lumber Pul~ 
Unlevered beta 0.26 0.24 0.30 
Levered beta 0.32 0.30 0.37 
Average assets -$millions 1,782 802 734 
Asset weighted product levered beta 0.31 
WFT adjusted levered beta by product 0.32 0.32 0.39 
The levered beta for West Fraser is very close to the asset weighted product line 
levered beta. The pure-play proxy firms explain the West Fraser beta of .32 closely with 
the asset weighted product line levered beta at .31. 
Table 12. Comparison of five years 2000-2004 actual return on assets to product line 
WACC for West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. 
West Fraser 2000-2004 Actual Product line 
Return on Assets WACC 
Lumber 10.4% 6.0% 
Panels 8.4% 5.2% 
Pulp 2.6% 6.3% 
Total 6.9% 6.0% 
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Panel 
0.09 
0.11 
245 
0.11 
The asset weighted product line betas for West Fraser can then be used to 
calculate the West Fraser product line cost of capital. For the five-year period 2000 to 
2004 West Fraser return on assets for the lumber and panel segments significantly 
exceeded the product line weighted average cost of capital. The pulp segment, however, 
returned less than half the required operating income for the investment in assets. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to note a limitation in the Fuller and Kerr pure-play technique of 
beta estimation for determining the cost of capital by product line in a multi-product firm. 
The comparison firm used must be a close match in order for the resulting cost of capital 
calculation to be representative for the division. It is a common practice to identify 
several pure-play firms in order to ensure that the beta used is appropriate. Unfortunately, 
there are few pure-play firms in the product lines of lumber, pulp and panels. The three 
firms used are the best proxy firms available, but are not exact matches for the business 
lines of Canfor and West Fraser. The operations of International Forest Products Ltd, the 
proxy firm used for lumber, are primarily located in coastal areas where operating 
conditions and risks can be different than the Northern Interior region. SFK Pulp has only 
one operation and it is located in Eastern Canada, and again the operating conditions can 
be different. Ainsworth has operations in both Eastern and Western Canada with several 
being located very close to Northern B.C. Without further evidence that the betas from 
the proxy firms used are appropriate for these product lines, there is a possibility that the 
cost of capital used in this study is not the true cost of capital for these business lines. 
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Canfor, which is a better proxy for the Northern British Columbia forest industry 
than West Fraser because 66% of their lumber capacity, 100% of their pulp capacity and 
100% of their panels capacity is in the northern interior, is not earning its cost of capital. 
Over the five-year period 2000- 2004, the company earned 5.2% return on assets while 
the weighted average cost of capital for Canfor was 6.9%. Further, both the lumber and 
pulp segments did not generate the required returns so there is no opportunity to change 
the transfer price of chips in order to move returns from one segment to the other. Despite 
this, Canfor has been investing in sawmills in the north. The company obviously expects 
to be able to generate the required returns on their new investments. The panels segment 
performed very well and Canfor and Louisiana Pacific have recently constructed a new 
OSB plant in Fort StJohn. The pulp segment has earned only half of its cost of capital. 
This is a strong warning signal that the pulp industry is in danger in Northern British 
Columbia. If no steps can be taken to improve returns the industry is at risk of extinction. 
Canfor accounts for 45% of lumber capacity, 55% of pulp capacity and 41 % of panel 
capacity in the Northern Interior. 
West Fraser has earned 10.4% return on lumber assets while the WACC for that 
product segment is only 6.0%. West Fraser lumber capacity in the north is 43% of their 
total lumber capacity. This is a significant portion. The company has no panel facilities in 
the northern interior. West Fraser has 40% of their pulp capacity in the north (the 
Eurocan Pulp and Paper facility in Kitimat) . The performance of West Fraser's pulp 
assets at 2.6% return is worse than Canfor. West Fraser has expressed concern about the 
performance of Eurocan in their annual report. 
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PriceWaterhouseCoopers used an estimated cost of capital for the lumber industry 
of 10.5% in their report on the forest industry in Canada 2003. They did not provide a 
calculation or explanation on how they arrived at this rate. Using the methodology 
outlined in this report, the cost of capital for the two largest firms operating in the 
Northern Interior of British Columbia is actually 6.0% for West Fraser and 6.9% for 
Canfor. Canfor is close to earning this rate and West Fraser far exceeds it. 
The softwood lumber dispute has increased costs for Canadian producers shipping 
to the U.S. market because of the duties imposed by the United States. By the end of 
2004 Canfor had accumulated duty on deposit of US$538 million. Assuming an average 
exchange rate of US$.85, the duties on deposit would increase net operating earnings 
after tax (NOPAT) by $70 million per year over the five-year period, increasing Canfor's 
return on lumber assets to 9.0% (exceeding their cost of capital) . The dispute is having a 
material impact on Canadian lumber producers but there is no indication when it will be 
resolved, or what will be the terms of resolution. It is also unclear how much, if any, of a 
potential duty refund is reflected in the stock prices of lumber producers. 
The recent trend to industry consolidation is not completely reflected in the 
financial statements of Canfor and West Fraser. The five-year period used in this analysis 
only captures the last nine months of the Canfor-Slocan combination and none of the 
West Fraser-Weldwood combination. It would be very interesting to perform this analysis 
after five years of post merger performance. Both Canfor and West Fraser are currently 
investing in new lumber mills to reduce costs and process mountain pine beetle killed 
logs. 
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As the volume of beetle killed logs increases, sawmill operating costs will 
increase with dry logs becoming more difficult to process. It remains unclear how readily 
the market will accept lumber discoloured by the bluestain fungus. These issues will be a 
challenge for a successful forest industry in Northern B.C. 
The pulp industry has not earned the required rates of return for either Canfor or 
West Fraser facilities . This is a major concern for both the pulp and lumber segments. 
Pulp producers will not be able to attract investment capital if they cannot pay the 
required rate of return. Without investment capital, facilities may not remain cost 
competitive and high cost producers are ultimately forced out of business. The lumber 
producers will then have no customer for their residual chips, increasing lumber 
manufacturing costs. 
The rates of return earned in the pulp segment during the 2000-2004 period will 
not sustain investment in the Northern British Columbia forest industry. Lumber is very 
close to earning required returns, and panels have exceeded the required return. 
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Appendix 1. Selected government and corporate long term bond yields. 
fiiiiiii1 BANK O f CANADA _...... 
MONTHLY Series: 
V122544: SELECTED GOVERNMENT OF CANADA BENCHMARK BOND 
YIELDS: LONG-TERM 
Low 12/2005 4.02 
Average 01/2000- 02/2006 5.31 
High 01/2000 6.27 
Copyright© 1995-2005, Bank of Canada. Permission is granted to reproduce or cite portions 
herein, if proper attribution is given to the Bank of Canada. Contact us. 
Source: http://www. bankofcanada.calcgi -bin/famecgi fdps 
riiiiiii1 BANK OF CANADA _...... 
MONTHLY Series: 
V122518: OTHER BONDS: AVERAGE WEIGHTED YIELD (SCOTIA CAPITAL 
INC.) - ALL CORPORA TES LONG-TERM 
Low 08/2005 5.04 
Average 01/2000- 02/2006 6.49 
High 05/2001 7.36 
Copyright© 1995-2005, Bank of Canada. Permission is granted to reproduce or cite portions 
herein, if proper attribution is given to the Bank of Canada. Contact us. 
Source: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/cgi-bin/famecgi fdps 
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Appendix 2. Lumber mills in the Northern Interior Forest Region with a capacity 
exceeding 40 million board feet per year. 
LUMBER MILLS 
Millions Cantor/ %of Mill Forest of 
Number Company Location of Mill District Board 
WFT Total 
Feet capacity capacity 
128 Abitibi-Consolidated Co. of Canada Mackenzie Mackenzie 249 
129 Abitibi-Consolidated Co. of Canada Mackenzie Mackenzie 201 
137 Apollo Forest Products Ltd. Fort St James Fort St James 130 
130 Canadian Forest Products Ltd . Mackenzie Mackenzie 480 3095 45% 
193 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Houston Nadina 442 
140 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Engen Vanderhoof 347 
153 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 344 
127 Canadian Forest Products Ltd . Chetwynd Peace 227 
166 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 225 
160 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Bear Lake Prince George 192 
122 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Fort StJohn Peace 182 
135 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Isle Pierre Prince George 175 
97 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 140 
121 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Fort Nelson Fort Nelson 101 
133 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Fort St James Fort St James 240 
150 Carrier Lumber Ltd . Prince George Prince George 192 
737 Cheslatta Forest Products Ltd . Ootsa Lake Nadina 96 
158 Dunkley Lumber Ltd . Strathnaver Prince George 480 
558 Kispiox Forest Products Ltd . South Hazelton Skeena Stikine 48 
184 Kitwanga Mills Ltd. Kitwanga Skeena Stikine 55 
144 L & M Lumber Ltd. Vanderhoof Vanderhoof 168 
149 Lakeland Mills Ltd. Prince George Prince George 139 
732 PG Sort Yard Prince George Prince George 48 
136 Stuart Lake Lumber co. Ltd . Fort St James Fort St James 105 
181 West Fraser Mills Ltd . Burns Lake Nadina 73 1540 22% 
191 West Fraser Mills Ltd . Smithers Skeena Stikine 240 
213 West Fraser Mills Ltd . Burns Lake Nadina 260 
532 West Fraser Mills Ltd. LeJac Vanderhoof 240 
552 West Fraser Mills Ltd. Chetwynd Peace 240 
183 West Fraser Mills Ltd. Terrace Kalum 168 
530 Houston Forest Products Co. (WFT) Houston Nadina 319 
672 Winthro Contracting Ltd. Prince George Prince George 29 
162 Winton Global Bear Lake Prince George 298 
Number of Mills 33 Totals 6873 4635 67% 
Average size 
208 
Source: Major Primary Timber Processing Facilities in British Columbia 2004, Government of 
British Columbia, Ministry of Forests and Range 
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Appendix 3. Pulp and paper mills and panel mills in the Northern Interior Forest Region. 
PULP AND PAPER MILLS 
Thousands Cantor/ %of 
Mill Company 
Location of Forest District of Air Dry WFT Total Number Mill Metric 
Tonnes capacity capacity 
128 Abitibi-Consolidated Co. of Mackenzie Mackenzie 217 Canada 
500 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 302 1330 55% 
500 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 133 
500 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 137 
503 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Prince George Prince George 541 
335 Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Taylor Peace 217 
496 Eurocan Pulp & Paper Co. Kitimat Kalum 449 449 19% 
505 Pope & Talbot Ltd. Mackenzie Mackenzie 223 
205 Tembec Industries Ltd. Chetwynd Peace 207 
Number of Mills 8 Totals 2426 1779 73% 
Average size 303 
PLYWOOD, OSB, AND OTHER PANEL MILLS 
Mill Location of Millions of Cantor/ %of 
Numbe Company Mill Forest District 
square feet WFT Total 
3/8" capacity capacity 
Canadian Forest Products Ltd. -
121 PLY Fort Nelson Fort Nelson 302 
Canadian Forest Products Ltd. -
151 PLY Prince George Prince George 173 
Canadian Forest Products Ltd. -
459 OSB Fort Nelson Fort Nelson 516 991 41% 
Louisiana Pacific Canada Ltd. - Peace 650 OSB Dawson Creek 445 
Northern Engineer Wood Prod.-
Skeena Stikine 357 PNL Smithers 80 
Number of Mills 4 Totals 1516 991 41% 
Average size 379 
Source: Major Primary Timber Processing Facilities in British Columbia 2004, Government of 
British Columbia, Ministry of Forests and Range 
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Appendix 4. Canfor return on assets calculation for the years 2000- 2004 and five-year 
average. Slocan is not included until the purchase was completed at the start of the 
second quarter of 2004. 
Five Year Asset 
CAN FOR 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Average Allocation 
Net Operating Income After Tax 
Lumber 261 (6) 45 45 24 74 
Panels 77 3 16 
Pulp 28 15 8 8 141 40 
Corporate/other (35) (14) (18) (22) (9) (20) 
Total 331 (2) 35 32 156 110 
Identifiable Assets 
Lumber 1781 1078 976 995 967 1159 
Panels 234 42 0 0 0 55 
Pulp 911 829 876 899 978 899 
Corporate/other 1103 499 476 485 495 612 
Current liabilities -1100 -523 -397 -335 -659 -603 
Total 2929 1925 1931 2044 1781 2122 
Return on assets 
Lumber 14.6% -0.5% 4.6% 4.6% 2.5% 6.4% 
Panels 32.7% 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 28.8% 
Pulp 3.1% 1.8% 0.9% 0.9% 14.4% 4.5% 
Corporate/other -3.2% -2.8% -3.7% -4.5% -1.9% -3.2% 
Total 11.3% -0.1% 1.8% 1.5% 8.8% 5.2% 
Operating Income 
Lumber 412 (1 0) 71 75 41 
Panels 121 5 
Pulp 45 26 12 24 239 
Corporate/other (56) (24) (28) (36) (16) 
Total 522 (3) 55 63 264 
Tax rate 36.7% 42.1% 36.4% 39.5% 40.9% 
Corporate and other costs are comprised of corporate, head office and information 
technology costs. 2004 is unusually high due to the integration of Slocan. Corporate and 
other assets include long-term investments, deferred charges and other assets not directly 
related to a business segment. 
The Asset Allocation column shows the Net Operating Income After Tax after 
proportionately distributing the Corporate/other costs back to the business segments. It 
also shows Net Assets by business segment after proportionately distributing 
Corporate/other assets and Current liabilities back to the business segments. 
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Appendix 5. West Fraser return on assets calculation for the years 2000- 2004 and five-
year average. Weldwood is not included because the purchase was not completed until 
December 31, 2004. 
Five Year 
WEST FRASER 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Average 
Net Operating Income After Tax 
Lumber 192 25 91 63 64 87 
Panels 29 8 31 24 16 21 
Pulp (1 0) (19) 21 31 76 20 
Other (26) (8) (6) (5) 19 (5) 
Total 185 6 136 113 174 123 
Identifiable Assets 
Lumber 842 808 812 807 711 796 
Panels 209 230 246 258 274 243 
Pulp 684 675 741 765 775 728 
Other 405 374 317 490 694 456 
Current liabilities -385 -496 -387 -478 -462 (442) 
Total 1755 1591 1729 1842 1992 1782 
Return on assets 
Lumber 22.8% 3.1% 11.2% 7.8% 9.0% 10.9% 
Panels 13.9% 3.6% 12.5% 9.1% 5.7% 8.8% 
Pulp -1.4% -2.9% 2.8% 4.1% 9.8% 2.7% 
Other -6.4% -2.2% -1.9% -1.0% 2.7% -1.1% 
Total 10.6% 0.4% 7.9% 6.1% 8.7% 6.9% 
Operating Income 
Lumber 298 39 139 104 102 
Panels 45 13 47 39 25 
Pulp (15) (30) 32 52 122 
Other (40) (13) (9) (8) 30 
Total 288 9 209 187 279 
Tax rate 35.6% 35.7% 34.8% 39.7% 37.6% 
Corporate and other costs are comprised of corporate, head office and information 
technology costs. 2004 is unusually high due to the purchase of Weldwood. Corporate 
and other assets include long-term investments, deferred charges and other assets not 
directly related to a business segment. 
The Asset Allocation column shows the Net Operating Income After Tax after 
proportionately distributing the Corporate/other costs back to the business segments. It 
also shows Net Assets by business segment after proportionately distributing 
Corporate/other assets and Current liabilities back to the business segments. 
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